The purpose of this paper is to examine evolutionary processes of sectoral systems of innovation in catch-up situation. The main findings are: market catch-up of China's self-owned brand cars expanded from low to high end market segment. Changes of the five building blocks of innovation system of China's car industry drove the market catch-up since 1980's. The five building blocks are: market demand, industrial technology and knowledge base, institutional setting, industrial structure, firms' competences and strategy. China's car industry evolved through exploitation and exploration, which were affected by the five building blocks. The exploitation and exploration shaped the catch-up way of China's car industry: from production localization to design localization and self-owned brands. Exploration of the self-owned brand group built on exploitation of the jointventure group. The paper contributes to the research stream on sectoral systems of innovation by understanding building blocks and evolutionary processes at the base of change and growth in catch-up situation.
Introduction
National innovation system approach is critical to explain economic development (Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall 1992) . Innovation system approach expands to sectoral level about ten years ago (Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Malerba, 2002 Malerba, , 2004 . A sectoral system is a set of products and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products (Malerba, 2002) . A sectoral system of innovation has a specific knowledge base, technologies, inputs and demand (Malerba, 2002 (Malerba, , 2004 . The notion of "sectoral systems of innovation" has evolutionary theory and technological regimes as theoretic sources. Evolutionary theory places a key emphasis on dynamics, innovation processes, and economic transformation (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . A central place in the evolutionary approach is occupied by the processes of variety creation, retention, and selection (Nelson, 1995; Dosi,1997; Metcalfe,1998) . The notion of technological regime provides a synthetic representation of some of the most important economic properties of technologies and of the characteristics of the learning processes that are involved in innovative activities. The specific pattern of innovative activity of a sector can be explained as the outcome of different technological regimes that are implied by the nature of technology and knowledge (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1997) . Technological regimes play important roles in explaining different patterns of technological catch-up of different industries (Lee and Lim, 2001 ).
Some studies exemplify the approach of sectoral systems of innovation in explaining industrial leadership in developed countries. Mowery and Nelson(1999) focuses on the key factors that supported the emergence of national leadership in each industry, and the reasons behind the leadership shifts when they occurred by analyzing how seven major high-tech industries evolved in the USA, Japan, and Western Europe. Mowery and Nelson(1999) proposes that international differences in the availability of high-level skilled labors, capital, university systems, and domestic market demand are central to understanding industrial leadership emergence and shifts. Malerba(2004) proposes the framework of the 'sectoral systems of innovation' to analyze innovation in six major sectors in Europe including pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, telecommunications equipment and services, chemicals, software, machine tools and services. Malerba(2004) finds that innovation in a sector is affected by three groups of variables: knowledge and technologies; actors and networks; and institutions.
Other studies have analyzed catch-up of later-coming countries from the lens of sectoral systems of innovation. Malerba and Mani (2009) points out that understanding the specificities of the relevant sectoral systems is fundamental in order to identify the sources of innovation and development. Knowledge base, actors, networks, characteristics of demand, and institutions are relevant factors in specificities of sectoral systems. Following the sectoral systems of innovation framework, Jung and Lee(2010) concludes that TFP catch-up by Korean firms is more likely to occur in sectors where technologies are more explicit and easily embodied in imported equipment with empirical data from Korean and Japanese electronics and automobile industries. Nelson (2011, 2012) use the framework of sectoral systems and argue that there are significant differences across these sectors in the variables and mechanisms involved in catching up. They identify the common factors affecting catching up, which including firms' learning, access to foreign know-how, skilled human capital, and active government policy. The main differences across sectoral systems are industry structure, demand and vertical links, and institutions.
China's automobile sector has experienced remarkable growth in the last two decades. MNC's entries and roles, market structure, and industry policies are examined to understand the fast development of the Chinese automobile industry. Lee et al.(2012) addresses the role of business networking and commitment to local market when MNCs enter an emerging market. Lee et al.(2012) finds that speed of foreign market entry is significantly influenced by business networking between MNCs and the key business and socio-political actors, since different types of business networking determine the level of learning and commitment. Sun et al.(2010) examines the complex relationship between the embeddedness of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in hostcountry political networks and their long-run competitive positions in host emerging markets. On the basis of the longitudinal study, Sun et al.(2010) unravels the underlying mechanisms that lead to the declining, and even negative, value of deep political embeddedness by MNEs in a politically stable emerging economy. Motohashi and Yuan(2010) finds that both multinationals and local firms in the assembly industry have vertical spillovers to local parts supply firms, but no horizontal spillovers in the automobile industry. Deng and Ma(2010) investigates the market structure and pricing strategy of China's automobile industry. Deng and Ma(2010)'s empirical results suggest that the leading automobile manufacturers set high markups, indicating their strong market power in China's automobile market. However, their declining markups in the late 1990's imply a reduction in market control by the major producers. Chu(2011) examines the development of the Chinese automobile industry and the evolution of the relevant industrial policies in the postreform period. Chu(2011) finds that the Chinese model of industrial policy propelled by the catch-up consensus has successfully promoted a global automobile industry despite earlier mistakes. Although these latest researches address some important factors in the development of China's automobile industry, evolutionary of this sector system is ignored, especially from the perspective of the local automobile assemblers. This means that catch-up of local automobile assemble companies is missing in the above researches.
In sum, the approach of sectoral systems of innovation has attracted broad interests in innovation research. The factors, which are fundamental to industrial leadership and catch-up, were examined with cases from different industries in different countries. Although evolutionary processes are key to sectoral systems of innovation approach (Malerba, 2002) , it remains a big challenge ahead to examine the specific evolutionary processes at the base of change and growth in sectors. And there are few studies in understanding catch-up of China's automobile industry from the perspective of local assemblers. To fill this literature gap, this paper examines how sectoral systems of innovation evolve in catch-up situation of China's car industry.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we briefly describe the market catch-up of China's car industry. In section 3 we describe dynamics of building blocks of innovation system of China's car industry. Section 4 describes how exploitation and exploration shape the catch-up way of China's car industry. Finally, in section 5, conclusions and discussions are presented.
Market Catch-up of China's Self-owned Brand Cars
China's automobile industry started from nearly zero in July 1953, when FAW was founded with the help of the Former Soviet Union. The FAW began to produce both trucks and cars in 1958. In 1958, the output of the China's car industry was 57 units while in 2011 it was 10.12 million units(as shown in figure 1 ).
Since 2009, China has become the biggest market both in production and consumption in the world. All auto MNCs competed in China's market and played important roles in the taking-off of car industry in China. Thirty-eight firms produce and sell sedans in China in 2011. The output of the top ten firms accounts for 64% of China's car industry in 2011(as shown in table 2). Obviously, Sino-foreign joint ventures dominate China's car industry. Eight out of the top ten firms are Sinoforeign joint ventures. These eight firms produce 55% of China's car industry output in 2011. The remaining two of the top ten firms are Geely and Chery, which develop and produce self-owned brands cars. Geely and Chery together produce only 8.9% of China's car output. They are relatively small compared to Sino-foreign joint ventures in China. Although foreign MNCs brands dominate China's car market, China's self-owned brands made big progresses in the taking-off stage. As figure 2 shows, output of China's self-owned brand car increased from 0.5 million units in 2004 to 3 million units in 2011, market share from 21% to 29%. China's self-owned brand car achieved this output and market share mainly through efforts in lowend market. All the top ten brands always come from foreign parents of Sino-foreign joint ventures in the following two market segments: C-class sedan, B-class sedan. The top ten brands account for more than 90% of market share in these market segments and where China's self-owned brand sedans are correspondingly weak.
Among the top ten brands of mini sedan segment, just two brands are from Sino-foreign joint ventures (see table 2 ). Chinese self-owned brands sedans dominate this market segment. The output ratio of self-owned brands to top ten in this segment is 80% in 2011. The share of QQ3, BENBEN MINI, F0, three new brands from Chery, Chang'an and BYD, is more than 50% in 2011. China's self-owned brands sedans are very strong in the mini sedan segment. Among the top ten brands of small sedan segment, five brands are from Sino-foreign joint ventures (see table 3 ). Foreign brand sedans dominate this market segment. The output ratio of self-owned brands to top ten in this segment is 38% in 2011. The share of top 4 in this segment, SALE, VERNA, POLO, LIVINA, four brands from GM, Hyundai, VW and Nissan, outstanding representatives of American, Korean, German, and Japanese sedans, is more than 50% in 2011. China's self-owned brand sedans are not strong in the small sedan segment. At most, the situation of five to five in the top ten segment means China's self-owned brand have the potential to compete head to head with foreign brands in this segment.
Among the top ten brands of compact sedan segment, just two are from self-owned brands (see table 4 ). Sino-foreign joint ventures dominate this market segment. The share of F3, VOLEEX C30, two brands from new entrants, Great Wall Motor and BYD, is just 16% in 2011. China's self-owned brands sedans are relatively weak in the compact sedan segment. Appearance of F3 and VOLEEX C30 in the top ten is a positive sign for the catch-up of self-owned brands. It's a progress of selfowned brands in recent years. It's a step in the road of market catch-up of self-owned brand sedans. In sum, China's self-owned brand cars market made obvious progresses in the market taking-off. Market catch-up of China's self-owned brand cars expanded from low to high end segment. China's self-owned brand cars dominated mini sedan segment, competed equally in small sedan segment, emerged in the top ten in compact sedan segment, very weak in class B and above sedan segments.
Dynamics of Building Blocks of Innovation System of China's Car Industry
How did building blocks of innovation system of China's car industry change and drive industry development during the catch-up since 1980's? Malerba(2002) identifies the possible building blocks of a sectoral system of innovation and production: knowledge base and learning processes; basic technologies, inputs and demand, with key links and dynamic complementarities; type and structure of interactions among firms and non-firms organizations; institutions; processes of generation of variety and of selection. Malerba(2004 Malerba( , 2011 argues that a sectoral system framework focuses on the nature, structure, organization, and dynamics of innovation and production in sectors, which including the following elements: (a) actors, (b) knowledge base, (c) institutions. A sectoral system framework is also open and contingent (Malerba, 2002 (Malerba, , 2004 (Malerba, , 2011 , one can define the building blocks according to the situation. Following Malerba(2002 Malerba( , 2004 Malerba( , 2011 framework, this section examines the dynamics of five building blocks of sectoral system in catchup situation: (1)market demand, (2)industrial technology and knowledge base, (3)institutional setting, (4)industrial structure, (5)firms' competences and strategy.
Market Demand
Market demand is the most important building block in the innovation system of China's car industry. The following three points are relevant in explaining the role of demand in China's car industry: (1) government policy cannot drive the growth of China's car industry without demand increase; (2) growth of demand induced the technology import via Sino-foreign joint ventures in the middle 1980's; (3) take-off of China's car industry is pulled by domestic demand, especially the family consumption.
Major Driving force of Industry Growth: Demand vs. Government Policy
In August 1984, the central government decided that "China's auto industry (including car industry) should have a huge development" for the first time. Auto industry was planned to be a strategic industry in the seventh five-year plan of China in 1986. Some provincial governments also nominated auto industry as one of their pillar industries. More resources were put into the auto industry. But, nonetheless, the output of China's car industry was just 35,000 units in 1990, 337,000 units in 1995, and 607,000 in 2000. The market remained relatively small due to the low level per capita GDP. Per capita GDP was just RMB YUAN 1643 in 1990, RMB YUAN 4854 in 1995, which is less than 5% of the price of a normal sedan, for example Santana or Jetta, which price is about RMB YUAN 170,000 at that time. Demand is "cold" in spite of policy being "hot". So, the increase of China's car industry is relatively slow from the middle of the 1980's to the middle of the 1990's.
Demand Initiated the Sino-foreign Joint Ventures in the Middle 1980's
Since 1983, the demand for cars increased dramatically. The domestic production could not meet the demand. As table 6 shows, the number of imported cars was almost at the same level with the output of domestic production in 1983, 3.6 times higher in 1984, and 20 times higher in 1985. Just about 5% of cars were domestically produced. This means that China had to pay a large part of scarce foreign exchange to import cars and that car consumption was highly dependent on import. So, the central government decided to develop the domestic production of cars. Due to the big gap between Chinese firms and foreign MNCs, importing technologies and products via Sino-foreign joint ventures was seen as a reasonable and quick way to develop domestic production. In terms of reducing the import share of the market this strategy was quite successful. Reflecting that Shanghai Volkswagen and Guangzhou Peugeot had begun to produce sedans, the ratio of imported cars to domestic output decreased quickly from 2031% in 1985 to 42% in 1988 (as shown in table 5). 
Take-off Pulled by Domestic Demand, Especially the Family Consumption
In 2002, per capita GDP of China amounted to about 1000 US$ as shown in figure 3 . Since this year, the demand began to surge. More and more families can afford sedans, especially the low price small or mini sedans. As figure 4 shows, the share of family consumption of sedans in China's car market increased dramatically from 10% in 1995 to 80% in 2006. Since 2001, family consumption has exceeded government and business consumption. Family consumption did create both bigger market capacity and more diverse needs. 
Industrial Technology and Knowledge Base
Car technology is complex. And its technological complexity is growing. Its production technologies include welding, flexible electronics-based automation technologies, and, not least, complex information processing technologies. Materials technology is including more and more aluminum and plastic material technology as well as steel technology. Electronic controls include stand-alone electronic components in engine management and braking systems and instrumentation, global positioning systems, and remote diagnostics (Kaplinsky, 2005) . The technological complexity is one serious barrier for new entrants.
There is a tendency toward product modularization and global sourcing in the global car industry. The customized and flexible assembly operations, which provide competitive advantage in final markets, require close coordination on a just-in-time basis with suppliers. Assembly is increasingly clustered geographically with component supply (Kaplinsky, 2005) . With the production growth of the Sino-foreign joint ventures, more and more 'follower suppliers' have become present in China. It is easier to find sub-assembly and component suppliers in both international and domestic market.
Car industry is a relatively mature industry due to the long history. There are independent design firms in the international market. Technical experts are also available in the international labor market. To some extent, a new entrant can outsource design and recruit experts if it can afford to pay the prices. In other words, you can buy technologies, designs and human resources. The problem is not how to start by buying, but how to enhance in-house capabilities by R&D-efforts and by learning by doing. For example, Brilliance China outsourced a sedan product design at the cost of US$ 62 million in 1997. Then it also outsourced assembly and component design at the cost of US$ 100 million. Brilliance China got all the intellectual properties, but did not get the capabilities to master these processes by itself immediately. This resulted in problems in the subsequent production and after-sale service.
Institutional Setting
In this section we list some of the most important events relating to public policy since this is a major factor in shaping the overall institutional set-up, including the role of private market oriented activities and public centrally planned activities.
In August 1984, the central government decided that "China's auto industry (including car industry) should have a huge development" for the first time.
Auto industry was planned to be a strategic industry in the seventh five-year plan of China in 1986.
In August 1987, the central government decided the "big three and small three" sedan production bases according to scale intensive characteristic of car industry. The "big three" are FAW, SAW and SAIC. The "small three" are Beijing auto, Tianjin auto and Guangzhou auto.
In July 1988, 'localization community of Shanghai VW Santana sedan', bringing together component suppliers and the assembly plants, was founded. This promoted the localization of Santana sedan component supply and initiated an efficient sedan component supply system in China.
In January 1991, it was decided that the development of the auto industry should depend more on sedans instead of trucks. And the big three should play an important role in this field..
In March 1994, state industry policy for auto industry was approved by state council. The main points were: (1) "3 plus 6", the goal of auto industry in 20 century is to cultivate 2~3 competitive strong auto groups, 6~7 major auto firms; (2) encouraging scale intensive tendency, including the combination of existing auto firms the scale of a new production investment project of 1.6 L and below engine sedans should exceed 150,000 a year; (3) a foreign auto company can establish at most 2 Sino-foreign joint ventures in the same kind of vehicles (for example, sedans) in China. The stock share of Chinese partners in a Sino-foreign joint venture for vehicle, motorcycle, or engine production should not be less than 50%; (4) encouraging localization of vehicle components in Sino-foreign joint ventures with preferential duties.
In 2000, the recommended tenth five-year plan of national economy and social development was approved. Family consumption of sedans was encouraged in this plan. Family consumption of sedans was included in state policies for the first time.
In May 2001, the former state planning committee announced that the prices of sedan would not be regulated any more. It means that all firms can decide the prices of their sedans instead of the government.
On December 11, 2001 , China entered into WTO.
In May 2004, development policy for auto industry was issued by state development and reform committee. It replaced the state industry policy for auto industry issued in 1994. The main points were: (1) Top 500 in the world, the goal of auto industry in 2010 is to cultivate several internationally competitive auto groups, which can be listed in the top 500 corporations in the world; (2) encouraging scale intensive tendency, the investment in a new vehicle production project that should exceed RMB Yuan 2 billion, among which RMB Yuan 800 million should be equity capital, and an R&D institute should be established at the same time with a budget of at least RMB Yuan 500 million; (3) A foreign auto company can establish at most 2 Sino-foreign joint ventures in the same kind of vehicles(for example, sedans) in China. The stock share of Chinese partners in a Sino-foreign joint venture for vehicle, motorcycle, or engine production should not be less than 50%; (4) Vehicle producers should establish good service system for consumers. The encouragement of localization of vehicle components in Sino-foreign joint ventures was cancelled in this new policy.
So the policy has gone from truck production to car production, from import substitution to innovation orientation with R&D institutes, from compulsive localization to abiding WTO rules, from production side only to both consumption and production, from command style to market regulation. But the scale intensive tendency has always been one of the policy focuses.
Industrial Structure
China's car industry is characterized by a dual structure with "the big three" corporations protected by government policy and some smaller ones with a less prominent position. Even though the entry into this industry was strictly regulated, some new entrants have been emerging. There are now more than 30 sedan production firms in China. Due to the price policy in the earlier period, a new entrant could make profit even with small scale production in China. Local governments have been helping local firms to enter into car industry due to the good profitability and high tax contribution of sedan production firms. The original "3+3" evolved to "3+6", then to "3+6+n". The concentration rate of China's car industry has been declining dramatically in recent years due to deregulation. The CR4 of China's car industry decreased from 83.0% in 1999, to 69. 
Firms' Competences and Strategy
Different firms start from different competences. They will follow different development trajectories due to path-dependency with different strategies. Firms in China's car industry could be categorized in two groups: (1) joint-venture group, which has rich experience in auto industry, but not so much experience in car industry; (2) self-owned brand group, which has almost no experience in auto industry. Firms in the two groups have followed two different strategies: (1) firms of joint-venture group adopted the joint venture strategy with foreign companies; (2) firms of self-owned brand group adopted the innovation strategy with self-owned brands. They experienced different learning processes.
Exploitation and Exploration in Evolution of China's Car Industry
Exploitation is efficient employment of current assets and capabilities, while exploration is development of novel capabilities (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006 ). China's car industry evolved through exploitation and exploration. The five building blocks affect exploration and exploitation differently (as shown in table 6). Typical actors of exploitation are joint venture group firms, who are still dominating the China's car industry with foreign brands. Typical actors of exploration are self-owned brand group firms, is emerging and growing fast with self-owned brands. Exploitation and exploration shaped the catch-up way of China's car industry: from production localization to design localization and self-owned brands. The self-owned brand group focuses on sedans. The joint-venture group has wide product lines in sedans, trucks and buses. The self-owned brand group with less knowledge about autos is probably brave innovator, who is 'no knowledge, no worry'. In the era of reform and open to outside after 1978, they entered into car industry at different time and adopted different strategies shaped by the five building blocks of sectoral systems of innovation. They experienced different learning processes. This section introduces: (1) exploitation based learning I: production localization of Shanghai VW Santana; (2) exploitation based learning II: design localization of Shanghai VW PASSAT LINGYU; (3) exploration based learning: learning by design cooperation; (4) relationship between exploitation and exploration. 
Exploitation Based Learning I: Production Localization of Shanghai VW Santana
Shanghai VW started from CKD(completely knocked down). China paid a large part of scarce foreign currency to import sub-assemblies and components. In 1987, the central government and Shanghai municipal government required Santana to produce their cars with at least 40% local content. If not, Shanghai VW would be closed. The local content increased rapidly to 60% in 1990, 85% in 1994 (as shown in table 7) and 90% in 1997.
The major facts in the localization process are:
Establishing Sino-foreign joint ventures and importing equipments and technologies: A component supply system of more than 200 firms came into being. About 100 Sino-foreign joint ventures were founded. The remaining 100 or so domestic firms imported advance equipments. Some of the domestic firms imported technologies via license. Organizing research and development programs for localization. In connection with the R&D process, some German experts were invited to China, while some Chinese engineers were trained in Germany. Shanghai municipal government and central government gave substantial support. In July 1988, 'localization community of Shanghai VW Santana sedan', bringing together component suppliers and the assembly plants, was founded by the government. The price of Santana increased by RMB Yuan 20,000. For each Santana sedan RMB Yuan 28,000 was specially used for localization. Central government gave preferential duties to Santana component import according to the local content(Xie and Wu, 1997).
The major achievements of the localization process are:
Shanghai VW mastered the manufacturing process of sedans. Management capability was improved. The capability of evaluating technologies and equipments was enhanced.
On the basis of localization, Shanghai VW joined in the adaptive design of Santana 2000 with Germany VW. The local content of Santana 2000 was 63.6% at the beginning of production. A few domestic component suppliers succeeded in strengthening their development capability in the localization process. For example, Shanghai clutch factory improved and made lighter the too heavy clutch in the localization process. Then, they developed new clutch models for other car producers(Xie and Wu, 1997).
While the manufacturing capability was strengthened through localization, the same has not been true for R&D capability and indigenous innovation in Sino-foreign joint ventures. So they still remain in between the OEM to OBM stages. Gallagher(2004) found that U.S. foreign direct investment in the automotive sector did not strongly contribute to improving China's technological capabilities because little knowledge was transferred along with the product. The cultivation of R&D capability and indigenous innovation is one of the biggest challenges in the joint-venture group. The major elements of design localization of Passat Lingyu:
Exploitation Based
Marketing research and product concept development: Shanghai VW visited more than 30 cities and held more than 300 interviews with existing Passat users. They analyzed the feedback data of about 1,600,000 users in the last 5 years. Then they developed a product concept which would really satisfy local taste. Interior design: from simple to luxurious interior preferred by Chinese customers. The pure cream-colored decoration, combined with chestnut-colored inner accessorize panel and instrument panel, make the interior more pleasant and harmonious. The combination of elegant light-brown color and pure cream color demonstrates the nobility of PASSAT LINGYU, and the peach-wood makes it smell naturally fragrant. The sofa-like chairs, plus the genuine leather, enable its passengers to enjoy the comfort of Italian furniture. Warm color, peachwood and colorful genuine leather are popular by the new users in China. Comfortable human-machine interface design: a door with umbrella cabinet; seat height according to the average height of Chinese people instead of German; Capacious inner space; White-colored instrument panel with background lighting. Advanced consumer electronics system: three-screened DVD; MP3 player; blue-booth earphone for mobile phone; automatic air-conditioner control; Satellite GPS. This make it can compete with Japanese or Korean sedans. The senior engineer told us that the whole consumer electronics system was even cheaper than that of the old Passat although it's much more advanced due to local design and local supply. The VW designers were surprised by this change and would adopt similar system in other VW's sedans.
In one word, it's a B-class sedan with C-class interior. This kind of design is very popular in China. Even in the mini sedan, you can see the peach-wood like interior decoration. It also was given a mixed name Passat Lingyu. Lingyu is a Chinese word which means leading and controlling. The target users of Passat Lingyu are successful business elites who are in leading positions and at the age of 30s to 40s. The name matches it's market target.
The major achievements of the design localization process are:
Shanghai VW design center mastered the whole development process of a new sedan. This is the first time for Shanghai VW design to experience the whole development process. They can manage other development processes after this. For example, they are developing Santana 4000, a new model of the Santana serial. Mixed brands can be well accepted by VW, SAIC, and Chinese users. This will be used in other sedan serials to revitalize business. For example, Polo Jinqingjinqu is based on Polo. Jinqingjinqu is a Chinese word which means energetic and great passion. The transformation of strategic position of Shanghai VW: the joint-venture will build development and design capabilities after manufacturing capability. Building development and design capabilities has been a one-lateral passion of Chinese partners in the last ten years. Due to the efforts of Chinese partners, more than 3 billion Yuan has been invested into R&D in this joint venture. 40 engineers were sent to VW Germany to be trained in 1998. There are more than 700 engineers in Shanghai VW design center. When VW headquarter decided to enhance local design, the opportunity was given to Shanghai VW. At this time, both German and Chinese partners have the same vision for Shanghai VW: developing sedans for Chinese markets according to the VW's new product launch plan. The engineers learned much by real design work. They were more confident after Passat Lingyu. This shows that they can do something in Chinese sedan market. And they can do more challenge work in the future.
Exploration Based Learning: Learning by Design Cooperation
Hafei built indigenous innovation capability through learning by design cooperation (LU, 2005) . In 1996, Pininfarina from Italy cooperated with Hafei to design a mini van "Zhongyi". Hafei presented an initial product concept and some specifications. Then Pininfarina designed an ABU model. A few Chinese engineers from Hafei were in Pininfarina and followd the design process. They stayed in a special office and tracked how the drawings developed. Pininfarina's engineers modified the drawings according to their opinions. About five Hafei engineers stayed at Pininfarina at the same time. Although they could not join in the detailed design process, they learned something about design process and on this basis they found shortcomings of Hafei's own design process. Pininfarina designed the bodywork of the mini van "Zhongyi", while Hafei designed the chassis by itself. So, Hafei developed Zhongyi via cooperation. It was significant that while Hafei outsourced some of the design they remained in control of the process as a whole. Zhongyi was very successful after it was launched in 1999.
In 2000, Hafei began to develop a mini sedan "Lobo". Hafei cooperated with Pininfarina again to design the bodywork. Hafei engineers were more involved in this design. An engineer stayed at Pininfarina for 1~3 months. Through rotation, about 100 engineers were at Pininfarina during the design process. Hafei designed the chassis. Then Hafei asked British Lotus to optimize the chassis design. Hafei selected the engine and gearbox by itself. In a word, Hafei controlled the whole development process. Lobo was a successful mini sedan in the market.
After the Zhongyi and Lobo, Hafei developed mini van "Minyi" and mini sedan "Baili" by itself.
Chery also participated in cooperative design at several occasions. According to Automotive News Europe, "Chery, a small independent automaker based in the central China province of Anhui, is developing six models for export. Bertone of Italy is designing at least one sedan and an SUV for Chery. Fellow Italian design house Pininfarina also is styling a vehicle for Chery, while AVL List of Austria has designed a series of engines." (Webb, 2005) Jeely collaborated with worldwide vehicle technology companies to enhance R&D capabilities: 
Relationship between Exploration and Exploitation
There are two key relationships between exploitation of the joint-venture group and exploration of the self-owned brand group: (1) sharing the component supply system; (2) experienced tenants joining in the self-owned brand group from the joint-venture group.
A local component supply system became into being after about a decade of production localization of the joint-venture group. Many experts in manufacturing and marketing were cultivated in the joint-venture group. Hundreds of engineers were trained to design sedans in the joint ventures or the Chinese parent companies of the joint ventures although they made a little progress in new sedan development. As latecomers, the self-owned brand group takes advantage of these conditions.
Chery didn't establish a specific component supply system as "the big three" did. Joint ventures of "the big three" purchased a large part of the components from the companies belonged to both foreign and Chinese parent corporation. This is partly the reason of high purchase cost. Chery took advantage the production capability surplus of the component supply system of "the big three". Chery asked them to bid for the component supply to reduce the purchase cost effectively as well as to quality assurance.
Geely also made use of the existing component system established by "the big three". It collaborated with some component companies belonging to "the big three" on some key components. For example, Geely collaborated with Shanghai Drive Shaft Co. Ltd., which is a joint venture controlled by German GKN and SAIC. Shanghai Drive Shaft developed drive shaft products for Geely with its own intellectual property. Shanghai Drive Shaft does have design capability but has no opportunity to use it when it supplies SAIC's joint ventures. This is really a win-win collaboration for Shanghai Drive Shaft and Geely.
Some experienced tenants joining in the self-owned brand group from the joint-venture group (as shown in table 8). They played important roles in both groups. They contribute a lot to the catch-up of China's car industry.
In sum, exploration of the self-owned brand group built on exploitation of the joint-venture group. 
Conclusions and Discussions
The dynamics of five building blocks of sectoral system in catch-up situation, which include market demand, industrial technology and knowledge base, institutional setting, industrial structure, and firms' competences and strategy, affect exploration and exploitation differently. Changes in these five building blocks legitimize exploration or exploitation in different stage of car industry development in China. Typical actors of exploitation are joint venture group firms, who are still dominating the China's car industry with foreign brands. Typical actors of exploration are selfowned brand group firms, is emerging and growing fast with self-owned brands. Exploitation and exploration shaped the catch-up way of China's car industry: from production localization to design localization and self-owned brands.
These findings contribute to two research streams. One stream is sectoral system of innovation research stream. It bridges the linkages between dynamics of building blocks and evolution of a sectoral system via exploration-exploitation mechanism. And it unveils heterogeneous behaviors in the catch-up of a sector in a large market like China. Although the decentralized and heterogeneous policies have been identified (Chu, 2011) This research has implications to innovation policy. China is a developing country with a huge domestic market. The possibility of heterogeneous behaviors should be encouraged to promote capability development of local firms. So, the flexibility of innovation policy is important to encourage local firms to innovate differently. Joint ventures, technology import, joint-design, technology alliances all are possible means to enhance innovation capability. And there is a debate in China about the roles of joint-ventures in innovation of China's automobile industry. This research identifies the positive roles of joint-ventures, which provide conditions for exploration of local firms. But in the long run, local firms are expected to build independent innovation capability.
Although this research has the above theoretical and empirical implications, it has limit as all the single case study. The findings of this research are based on a single industry. Studies on more industries are needed to generalize the research results. And this presents more process but not courses, which covers the real dynamics of the industry's development. The course of those history events should be paid more attention to. These limits should be improved in the furtherer studies.
Research on the evolutionary courses of different specific sectors is relevant both in innovation system research and in catch-up research. How the interactions among elements of sectoral system of innovation evolve? How knowledge interactions among actors of sectoral system of innovation happen? And what are the roles of system interactions in catch-up of different industries in China? These questions are inviting more researches in this promising innovation field.
